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Environmental Compliance and Human Capital: Evidence from Chinese 
Industrial Firms  
Jing Lan 
a
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b
  
Abstract: By using a unique cross-sectional dataset of Chinese industrial firms, this paper 
investigates the external and internal effects of human capital on firms’ environmental 
performance. The result shows that firms have better environmental compliance because they are 
‘pushed’ into making compliance decision by internal driver of human capital and ‘pulled’ to be 
environmental friendly by external force of social human capital stock. This finding is robust when 
we take into account of possible endogeneity of human capital. In addition, evidence from this 
study suggests that the situation of weak implementation of environmental supervision and evasion 
of environmental monitoring could be reconciled by internal and external effects of human capital. 
JEL classification:  Q01; Q52; Q55 
 
Keywords: Environmental compliance; Human capital; External and internal effects; Endogeneity 
1. Introduction 
The increasingly serious industrial pollution poses a challenge to China’s fast economic growth. 
Despite well-conceived laws, enforcement varies tremendously on the ground (Wang et al. 2003, 
Wang and Wheeler, 2005). Local governments’ focus on economic growth and firms’ resistance 
towards additional compliance have both brought about weak implementation (SEPA, 2006). Given 
this situation, it is important to understand the drivers behind compliance with environmental 
regulations. In this paper, we attempt to find empirical evidence on the factors behind compliance 
by using a unique environmental performance data of 2544 industrial Chinese firms. There is 
already a large literature on regulatory compliance. Our particular focus is on the relationship 
between human capital and compliance which we consider a neglected aspect of the existing 
research. Conceptually, the relationship between human capital and industrial pollution can be 
through either an internal or an external route. Within the firm, the implementation of abatement 
technology is determined by the absorptive capacity of internal human capital endowment, the 
higher the level of human capital, the better application within the firm. Outside the firm, higher 
educated people are more likely to tighten the stringency of environmental regulations by imposing 
pressure on environmental regulators. Based on the above descriptions, we hypothesize that (i) the 
internal effect of human capital pushes firms to voluntarily comply with environmental regulations 
and (ii) by enhancing regulatory pressure, the external effect of human capital also pulls firms to 
have better environmental performance. 
We aim to make three contributions to the existing literature. First, this paper sheds light on 
the internal and external effects of human capital on firms’ environmental performance. Our results 
show that firms have better environmental performance because they are ‘pushed’ into making 
compliance decision by internal endowment of human capital, and ‘pulled’ by external forces of 
social human capital stock. Accordingly, better environmental performances are achieved based on 
the internal and external drivers of human capital.  
Second, we take into account the possible endogeneity of both external and internal human 
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capital. From the internal side, as shown by Grolleaua et al. (2012), environmental-related standard 
(i.e. ISO 14001 standard) tend to improve the recruitment of professional employees. Such 
enhancement implies that better environmental performance deliver more than environmental 
benefits and firms can strategically use them for their ability to generate attractions to high 
educated or high skilled employees who are more sensitive to environmental protection. From the 
external side, higher educated people may move to cleaner cities since they are more sensitive to 
environmental quality. These issues have further interest given a potential two-way causality 
between human capital and environmental performance. Most of studies to be reviewed in section 2 
do not concern the endogeneity of human capital; our study on the other hand, better identifies the 
causal relationship between environmental performance and human capital.  
Third, in order to do our analysis we build a new database of firm-level data for China. 
Blackman and Kildegaard (2010) argue that most studies in developing countries rely on self-
reported firm-level environmental data. However, instead of self-reported one, the environmental 
performance data we use in this paper is evaluated and compiled by government environmental 
administration. The environmental performance might be different from regulator-reported than 
self-reported. Thus, our study may fill gap in the literature by providing evidence from the 
regulator-reported environmental data of Chinese industrial polluters. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we give a brief review of 
related literature on environmental performance and human capital, highlighting their connection 
though internal and external paths. Section 3 presents the data and explains the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 estimates the econometric models and discusses the results obtained. The 
final section concludes and derives policy implications. 
2. Related literature 
Human capital is an important internal factor that drives firms to voluntarily comply with 
environmental regulations. In order to adopt new technologies, firms must have corresponding 
stock of human capital to acquire the requisite technical and economic information. Information 
acquisition may be passive, with firms absorbing information via day-to-day contact with business 
associates, or it may be active, with firms engaging in training and technical extension program. In 
either case, information acquisition is greatly facilitated and accelerated by the firm’s pre-existing 
stock of human capital, that is, the education and training of the employment. Therefore, empirical 
studies of green technologies adoption typically find that firms with more human capital are more 
likely to adopt new technologies of abatement and have better environmental performance, all 
other thing being equal. For instance, in their study of Indonesian water polluters, Pargal and 
Wheeler (1996) find that average education level of employment is correlated with lower emission 
of water pollutant. Dasgupta et al. (2000) analyze the extent of adoption of ISO 14001 type 
environmental management practice by firms in Mexico. They show that firms with highly 
educated workers have significantly greater environmental management effort and compliance. 
Gangadharan (2006) also yields a further confirmation of the positive role of internal human capital 
on firms’ environmental performance survey evidence from manufacturing industries in Mexico. 
Manderson and Kneller (2012) suggest that firms with a greater intensity of human capital may 
have greater opportunities for technological advancement of pollution abatement though they fail 
to find significant result. Blackman and Kildegaard (2010) use original firm-level survey data to 
identify the factors that drive Mexican firms’ adoption of clean technologies and find that the key 
driver of adoption is the firms’ human capital.  
The external effect of human capital on firms’ environmental performance through community 
pressure has also been mentioned and studied in the literature. As Fishel (1979) and Nelson et al 
(1966) claim that people with higher education are more likely to be more aware of and evaluate 
environmental issues differently than do those with less education, people with high human capital 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-05
3 
are revealed to be more sensitive to surrounding environmental quality. Goetz et. al (1998) argue 
that changes in human capital modify individuals’ appreciation of environment independently of 
income, thereby causing changes in behavior that are measurable at the state level in the United 
States. They also show that educated decision-makers are more likely engage in community 
activities that improve the environment and persuade manufacturers to make effort in pollution 
abatement since those people are more likely to be aware of detrimental effects of environmental 
pollution on their health. Goldar and Banerjee (2004) find that the percentage change in the local 
literacy rate help explain water quality in river sections downstream from Indian industrial clusters. 
In the case of China, Dasgupta and Wheeler (1997) analyze the determinants of citizens’ 
complaints in 29 Chinese provinces and find that they are an increasing function of the levels of 
education. Dasgupta et al. (2001) show that informed citizens can have an important impact on 
pollution via inspections by using a panel data of major polluters from Zhenjiang city and they 
suggest that regulators to embark on education policies to control pollution. Cole et al. (2008b) 
examine the possible factors that may influence industrial pollution emissions in China by using a 
panel of 15 industries and their results suggest that regions with greater levels of education may 
have more stringent regulations.  
In addition to the possible better environmental performance resulting from efficient 
absorption and effective adoption of clean technology by human capital, several other studies have 
examined whether and how environment-related standards improve human resource management.  
Firms may adopt voluntary environmental initiatives to improve human resource management by 
facilitating recruitment, increasing employees’ morale and motivation, and thereby raising 
workforce productivity (Halkos and Evangelinos, 2002). Mzoughi et al. (2007) test their hypothesis 
that the probability of registering for a certified EMS increases as the firm wants to improve its 
human resource management and their results show that ISO 14001 registration among French 
agrofood firms was mainly driven by the desire to improve human resource management. More 
recently, Grolleaua et al. (2012) investigate the impact of environmental-related standards on 
employees’ recruitment using a bivariate probit model and their result show that firms can benefit 
from self-reinforcing effects and strengthen their greenness by attracting environmentally sensitive 
talent employees. Therefore, it is necessary for us to take into account the endogeneity of firms’ 
environmental performance on corresponding human capital level. 
3. Empirical methodology and data 
3.1 The environmental performance data 
The firm level data employed in this paper are compiled from State Bureau of Environmental 
Protection and China’s industrial enterprises database (survey data 2004); the city-level data are 
compiled from China Environmental Statistics Yearbook (2005), and sector level data are sourced 
from China Industrial statistics yearbook (2005). The original environmental performance rating 
data set is drawn from the environmental information disclosure system data (2004) of State 
Bureau of Environmental Protection with a total 3729 firms from SIC 4-digit industrial sectors 
covered 29 cities, 9 provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities) in 2004.  
The rating of firms’ environmental behavior is based on the public color-coded ratings system 
and was proposed by State Bureau of Environmental Protection in 2003 cooperating with World 
Bank. In the data set for 2004, the batch of 29 pilot cities includes Nanjing, Wuxi, Suzhou, 
Changzhou, Nantong, Zhenjiang, Xuzhou, Yancheng, Taizhou and Yangzhou in Jiangsu provinces; 
Hangzhou, Ningbo and Wenzhou in Zhejiang province; Jinan, Yantai and Zibo in Shandong 
province; Huainan, Huaibei, Tongling Maanshan and Chaohu in Anhui province; Huhehot in Inner 
Mongolia autonomous region; Jiayuguan in Gansu province; Zhuzhou and Changde in Hunan 
province; Jiazuo in Henan province, Liuzhou in Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region and 
Chongqing municipality. According to the document of SEPA (2004), the grading system draws on 
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15 indicators (see Table A1 in Appendix) and the conceptual scheme of the grading system is 
shown in Figure A1 in Appendix. On the basis of the grading system, firms’ environmental 
performance is divided into five symmetric rating categories, ranging from black (the worst 
performance) through red, yellow and blue, to green (the best performance). Table 1 summarizes 
the ranking system criteria for each category. Considering the different levels of economic 
development and the heterogeneity in stringency of environmental regulation across regions, it is 
quite possible that some local governments tend to loose evaluation standards. Therefore, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that green/blue statuses are achieved by weak standards rather than 
by firms’ strong performances. 
Table 1 Grading System of Firm Environmental Performance 
Color  Performance  Criteria 
Green 
 
Excellent 
 On the basis of blue color, enterprise obtains ISO 14000 certificate or 
passes cleaner production audit. Corporate environmental management 
reaches advanced level. 
Blue 
 
Good 
 The emission level is lower than relevant national emission standard. 
Enterprise has high level corporate environmental management. 
Yellow 
 
Fair 
 The emissions on the whole comply with relevant national emission 
standard. Emission level exceeding relevant national emission standard or 
non-compliance occurs occasionally. 
Red 
 
Poor 
 Emissions cannot comply with relevant national emission standard or 
more serious pollution accident happens. 
Black 
 
Very Poor 
 Emission level greatly exceeds relevant national emission standard and 
causes serious environmental impact or the most serious pollution 
accident happens. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of firms that participate in environmental ranking system by 
cities in 2004. In the whole sample, 56.2% of the sample firms are grouped in Hangzhou, Nanjing, 
Ningbo and Suzhou, these 4 eastern coastal cities, reflecting the size and situation of regional 
industrial agglomeration in China.   
To maintain confidentiality, the environmental information disclosure system of State Bureau 
of Environmental Protection only provides information on firms’ names, locations and levels of 
environmental performance. Hence, in order to obtain more firm-level and city-level characteristics, 
we use firm’s name and its location to link the environmental performance dataset to the China 
Industrial Enterprises Database (2004) and the dataset of China Industrial Yearbook (2005). China 
Industrial Enterprises Database collects almost all important aspects of a firms’ operation covering 
firms from all business sectors. We use a subset of the database data that contains the industrial 
firms in our environmental performance data and their detailed firm-level information, including 
ownership types, industry code, city code, R&D expenditure, sales, employee education level, asset, 
number of employment, value of exports, profits and industrial value added and etc. The China 
environmental statistics yearbook contains information about the air quality of city and the amount 
of pollution emission of each industry. After matching the data sets, we obtain a sample of 2554 
firms from 29 cities. For each firm we have information on firms characteristics such as levels of 
environmental performance, ownership types, firm size, firm age, industrial code, annual R&D 
expenditure, annual profit, annual value of exports, annual sales, total asset value and etc, and city-
level variables such as GDP per capita, unemployment rate, population density and market-oriented 
degree. The definitions and statistical descriptions of all variables used in our analysis are 
presented in the Appendix Table A3 and Table A4 respectively.  
The information on dropped observations is summarized in Table A2. As shown above, the 
environmental information disclosure system database only provides firms’ information on levels 
of environmental performance and their locations; we cannot apply the common data imputation 
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technique to deal with the missing data since we cannot find additional information to impute the 
missing values of all independent variables of the deleted observations. To check whether there 
exist sample selection bias or not, we carry out Chi-square significance tests by comparing the 
matched sample and full sample. Chi-square test of the null hypothesis is that there is no sample 
selection bias. First, we calculate the Chi-square test statistic only considering the distribution of 5-
level environmental performance. After calculation, we get χ
2
 = 0.106 (critical value of χ
2
=9.488 
with 4(=5-1) degree of freedom at the 1% significant level). Since χ
2
 statistic is smaller than its 
critical value, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no bias. Next, we calculate χ
2
 statistic by 
considering the distributions of environmental compliance in each city. Since χ
2
 statistic (0.595) 
does not exceeded the critical value for 1% significant level (80.15) with 112(=28×4) degree of 
freedom we accept the null hypothesis that there is no selection bias. 
Table 2 City profiles: all sample (2004) 
City 
Rating of Environmental performance  
Population 
(10000 persons) 
 
GDP/capita 
(10000 yuan) 
 Air 
quality 
index Green Blue Yellow Red Black
No. of 
firms 
   
Changde 2 
 
7 
 
11 
 
2 
 
1 
 
23 
 
601.05 
 
1.83 
 
0.87 
Changzhou 7 
 
23 
 
12 
 
2 
 
0 
 
44 
 
348.97 
 
3.63 
 
0.82 
Chaohu 4 
 
12 
 
14 
 
11 
 
0 
 
41 
 
453.96 
 
0.89 
 
0.85 
Chongqing 0 
 
13 
 
6 
 
4 
 
2 
 
25 
 
1017.57 
 
1.33 
 
0.66 
Hangzhou 48 
 
100 
 
192 
 
55 
 
5 
 
400 
 
651.68 
 
4.91 
 
0.80 
Huaibei 6 
 
31 
 
16 
 
3 
 
3 
 
59 
 
209.39 
 
1.50 
 
0.82 
Huainan 2 
 
18 
 
33 
 
5 
 
2 
 
60 
 
233.58 
 
0.98 
 
0.85 
Huhehot 13 
 
41 
 
25 
 
7 
 
1 
 
87 
 
214.70 
 
3.16 
 
0.85 
Jiaozuo 0 
 
20 
 
5 
 
2 
 
0 
 
27 
 
345.50 
 
1.48 
 
0.64 
Jiayuguan 1 
 
6 
 
7 
 
3 
 
0 
 
17 
 
16.76 
 
2.52 
 
0.90 
Jinan 10 
 
17 
 
19 
 
4 
 
2 
 
52 
 
590.08 
 
3.67 
 
0.57 
Liuzhou 13  39  35  7  1  95  210.24  1.92  0.75 
Maanshan 2 
 
18 
 
8 
 
3 
 
1 
 
32 
 
124.39 
 
2.95 
 
0.95 
Nanjing 74 
 
269 
 
208 
 
38 
 
5 
 
594 
 
583.60 
 
3.55 
 
0.81 
Nantong 18 
 
35 
 
47 
 
12 
 
4 
 
116 
 
773.79 
 
3.51 
 
0.88 
Ningbo 84 
 
261 
 
116 
 
4 
 
1 
 
466 
 
552.69 
 
6.04 
 
0.92 
Suzhou 140 
 
278 
 
198 
 
19 
 
3 
 
638 
 
598.85 
 
6.03 
 
0.84 
Taizhou 10 
 
46 
 
40 
 
10 
 
4 
 
110 
 
502.77 
 
3.17 
 
0.79 
Tongling 10 
 
57 
 
53 
 
13 
 
3 
 
136 
 
71.63 
 
2.98 
 
0.86 
Wenzhou 8 
 
31 
 
15 
 
0 
 
1 
 
55 
 
746.19 
 
4.58 
 
0.97 
Wuxi 21 
 
77 
 
71 
 
12 
 
3 
 
184 
 
447.19 
 
5.90 
 
0.79 
Xuzhou 5 
 
23 
 
34 
 
7 
 
4 
 
73 
 
916.85 
 
3.16 
 
0.60 
Yancheng 5 
 
30 
 
20 
 
3 
 
0 
 
58 
 
798.28 
 
1.59 
 
0.67 
Yangzhou 3 
 
14 
 
31 
 
4 
 
2 
 
54 
 
454.29 
 
3.22 
 
0.82 
Yantai 8  16  14  10  6  54  354.51  2.32  0.99 
Zhenjiang 24 
 
93 
 
40 
 
5 
 
4 
 
166 
 
267.21 
 
3.50 
 
0.73 
Zhuzhou 1 
 
18 
 
11 
 
4 
 
1 
 
35 
 
370.93 
 
2.48 
 
0.53 
Zibo 6  5  5  12  0  28  450.51  2.40  0.81 
Total 525 
 
1598 1286 
 
261 
 
59 
 
3729 
      
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of firms. We define the levels of compliance as over-
compliance, compliance and non-compliance according to the criteria of ranking as shown in Table 
1. Category green and blue are combined to obtain over-compliance and it represents 56.1% of 
firms in the data. The firms in these two categories have exceeded the environmental requirements 
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and claimed to have established high-level environmental management in their organization. 
Category yellow is defined as compliance (32.1% of firms) and includes firms that consistently 
observe the environmental regulations or usually comply with emission standards, though they 
sometimes fail in specific points. Categories red and black include firms that usually fail to obey 
environmental regulations and even cause the pollution accidents. Categories red and black are 
merged to obtain non-compliance since each of them accounts for a small percentage of total firms. 
Table 3 Environmental performance and firms’ distribution 
Environmental compliance  Over-compliance  Compliance  Non-compliance 
Color  Green Blue  Yellow  Red Black 
No. of firms  362 1072 820 253 47 
Percent  14.2 42.0 32.1 9.9 1.8 
Cum.  14.2 56.1 88.3 98.2 100.0 
3.2 Empirical methodology and variables 
To measure the actual outcome from internal and external effects we use data on the grading of 
firms’ environmental performances. Besides a variety of firm- and industry- characteristics, we 
also include a number of other control variables designed to capture characteristics of the location 
of firm that could influence the level of regulatory activity it faces. 
        The dependent variable environmental compliance Cji is a function of firm- and city-PEOPLE 
characteristics, as well as INDUSTRY and LOCATION variables. 
ji ji ji j, j ji jC f (FPEOPLE , FX ,CPEOPLE CX , INDUSTRY , LOCATION )=            (5) 
Following previous research studies, in addition to human capital, some other determinants 
that may have effects on environmental performance are also included in the estimation model as 
explanatory variables. We estimate the following model, 
i m m 1Pr(Compliance m | x ) F( X ) F( X )τ τ −= = − Φ − − Φ                             (6) 
h jih 1 2 ji 3 ji 4 ji n jinand X FPEOPLE Exports RD ROA SIZE OWNERSHIPε α β β β β ρΦ+ = + + + + +∑ ∑  
h jh 5 j h jh j 6 7 jCPEOPLE AIRquality CPEOPLE AIRquality UNEMP POPdenγ β ϕ β β+ + + × + +∑ ∑  
8 j 9 j 10 s 11 s 12 s 13 14 jiMarket GDPcap INTso2 INTwater INTsoot WEST EASTβ β β β β β β ε+ + + + + + + +  
where F is the cumulative distribution function of error term ε and F is normal with VAR(ε)=1. 
mτ
and 
m 1τ − are two cutpoints (thresholds) and two cutpoints leads to three levels of firms’ 
environmental performance: over-compliance, compliance and non-compliance. The ordered 
variable (Ci) is our indicator for environmental performance. FPEOPLE is a vector of share of 
employment with different education levels for firm: share of employment with college education 
and above (FCOLLEGEji), share of employment with senior high school education (FSENIORji) 
and share of employment with primary school education and below (FPRIMARYji). CPEOPLE is a 
vector of ratios of population with different education levels in a city including the share of 
population with college education and above (CCOLLEGEj), share of population with senior high 
school education (CSENIORj) and share of population with primary school education and below 
(CPRIMARYj). In both cases, the reference group in our study is population with junior high 
school education. 
First, let us review the variables of PEOPLE characteristics, those influencing the marginal 
benefits and marginal cost from pollution abatement at a particular firm. On the marginal cost side, 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-05
7 
we have the percentage of employees with different education levels within the firm (FCOLLEGEji, 
FSENIORji and FPRIMARYji). On the marginal benefit side, we also have the percentage of the 
population with different education levels in the city (CCOLLEGEj, CSENIORj and CPRIMARYj, 
σhq in Eq (2)), representing the sensitivities to environmental quality of different educational groups. 
We would expect to find positive signs for the coefficients in the high human capital levels of both 
firm and city. 
Next we define the firm-level explanatory variables that may affect a firm’s environmental 
performance. Research and development expenditure (RD), a proxy for the innovation within firms, 
will often lead to the improvements to the firm’s production process, might resulting in less need 
for energy per unit output. Thus, we might expect innovation expenditure to reduce a firm’s 
emission of pollutants. Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm form of employment. 
Cole et al. (2008a) investigate the role played by foreign direct investment on firms’ environmental 
performance and find that the size of firm is negatively related to its energy intensity and larger 
sized firms tend to have better environmental performance. We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between firm’s size and its environmental performance.  Age (AGE) is defined as the 
number of years from the year of their registration to year 2004, given the likelihood that newer 
firms may use more modern, cleaner technology to reduce the emissions (Cole et al., 2008a). A 
measure of the share of sales of each firm that is exported (Export) given the possibility that 
exporters may be cleaner in order to serve export market in the developed world where consumers 
are typical environmentally conscious. A proxy for firm’s financial performance is ROA given that 
firms with better financial performance often have better environmental performance.1  
We also include the firm-level ownership dummies in our empirical model. The 2004 survey 
data of China Industrial enterprises database defined six types of firm ownership. In particular, they 
are state-owned enterprises (SOE), foreign-owned enterprises (FDI), privately-owned enterprises 
(PRIVATE), public-listed companies (PUBLIC), collectives (COLLECTIVE), and non-state-
owned limited companies (LIMITED). These six types of ownership are mutually exclusive. SOEs 
include domestic SOEs, alliances of SOEs, and unlisted state-owned limited companies. Foreign-
owned enterprises include joint ventures with Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan (HMT) and other 
foreign investors. They also include HMT wholly-owned companies, HMT shareholding 
companies, wholly foreign owned companies, and foreign shareholding companies. Privately-
owned firms include private limited companies, private shareholding companies, proprietorships 
and partnerships. Public-listed companies are domestic public-listed companies. Collectives 
include companies that are registered as domestic collectives or domestic alliances of collectives. 
To compare the different environmental performances of foreign-owned enterprises, we make a 
separation of HMT related firms (including HMT wholly-owned firms and HMT shareholding 
firms) and other foreign related firms (including wholly foreign owned firms and foreign 
shareholding firms).  
The control variables of industrial characteristics include proxies for industrial dirtiness 
(INTso2, INTwater and INTsoot calculated as industrial emissions scaled by industrial value added) 
given the possibility that the dirtier the industry a firm included in, the worse environmental 
performance it shows.  
Our explanatory variables of city and regional characteristics include AIRquality 
Unemployment, POPdensity, Market, EAST and WEST. Using socioeconomic characteristics to 
identify the effect of community pressure may pick up any number of unobserved determinants of 
formal and informal regulatory pressures. We use the local environmental conditions, measured by 
                                                          
1
 As shown by Wang and Wheeler (2005), the cost of abatement technology is usually fixed, but pollution 
and thus government fines increases with output, so the relative cost of environmental compliance decreases 
with output. 
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air quality (AIRquality) as a proxy for social effort made to maintain or improve the environmental 
quality given the possibility that the more stringent environmental regulations might be imposed to 
maintain the better environmental condition. The proxies for local protectionism include 
Unemployment and Market. The unemployment rate might affect local pollution regulations for 
two reasons. First, a high unemployment rate in a region might attract more attention from the local 
authorities and force them to devote more resources to dealing with unemployment hence devoting 
fewer resources to pollution control. Second, communities in a region may tolerate the existence of 
a polluting plant nearby if it provides employment. Such an effect is more likely to occur in cities 
with a high level of unemployment. Both arguments suggest that a region with a high 
unemployment rate will tend to have lax environmental regulations and tolerate non-compliance 
with environmental regulations. Market is obtained from the NERI (National Economic Research 
Institute) Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces 2006 Report to measure the effort of local 
government to reduce local protectionism. A higher value indicates lower entry barrier to the local 
market and thus smaller local protection. We expect a city with higher Marketization index is 
associated with better environmental performance of the firm located in that city. Population 
density (POPdensity) may affect firms’ environmental behaviors through two ways. On the one 
hand, a densely populated area may imply there are more people adversely affected by pollution 
and hence opposition to such plants may be greater. Conversely, a pollution intensive plant may be 
less ‘visible’ in a densely populated, urban area and hence may escape the attentions of the local 
population (Cole et al., 2005).  EAST and WEST are regional dummies to capture the regional 
heterogeneity while central part of China works as the reference group. 
Finally, we add interactions between the air quality and the share of population in each 
education group to see whether the coefficient on the interaction terms differ across different 
educational groups, which also indirectly reflecting the different susceptibilities from different 
educational group on environmental conditions.  
3.3 Potential problem and instruments selection 
Following the instrumental-variables strategy of Fisman and Svensson (2007), we use industry-
location average share of college and above educated employees (ICOLLEGE) as an instrument al 
variable for FCOLLEGE. Our identifying assumption to deal with this problem is that 
FCOLLEGEji can be decomposed into two terms, one industry-specific, and the other particular to 
the firm:
jsi jsi jsFCOLLEGE Fcollege ICOLLEGE .= +  Here, ICOLLEGEjs denotes the (average) 
share of college and above educated employees common to location j and industry s, which in turn 
is a function of the underlying characteristics inherent to that particular industry location, while 
Fcollegeji denotes the specific component. We assume that the industry-specific part of human 
capital is determined by industry-specific components, we assume that ICOLLEGEj is exogenous 
to the firm, and hence uncorrelated with the error term	ε. If this assumption is valid, we may use 
ICOLLEGEjs to instrument for FCOLLEGEjsi, since jsCORR(ICOLLEGE , ) 0.ε =  In such a 
specification, using industry-location averages as an instrument for firm-level FCOLLEGEjsi gets 
rid of the biases resulting from omitted variables that are correlated with FCOLLEGEjsi at the firm. 
In our case, the industry-location averages we use should serve to mitigate the effects of 
measurement error which is a common concern when using micro-level data, since we generally 
think of these errors as being largely idiosyncratic to the firm, and hence uncorrelated with the 
average human capital level. We then define 
n
jsii 1
n
jsii 1
Number of employee with college and above education
ICOLLEGE
Number of employee
=
=
=
∑
∑
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where n is the number of firms in industry s, city j.
 2    
The range of ICOLLEGE is [0,1]. 
Another concern of this analysis is the potential for reverse causality due to self-selection of 
external human capital. Higher educated people could move to cleaner cities because they are more 
sensitive to environmental quality. Due to the existence of rigid “Hukou” system, labor in China is 
not as mobile as that in other countries in the world, whereas China still has witnessed tremendous 
internal labor migration since the reform of “Hukou” system was implemented. Thus, we cannot 
rule out this endogenous problem. To address this potential endogeneity, we introduce average 
number of books per person in public libraries (BOOK) and number of universities and colleges 
(UNIVERSITY) in each city as two instrumental variables for CCOLLEGE. These two instruments 
can be used as proxies for human capital stock of cities but are intuitively likely to be uncorrelated 
with environmental compliance.  
Besides the possible endogeneity caused by human capital,  another potential problem arises if 
the degree of environmental compliance is the joint result of government regulation and firm 
initiatives as shown by Yang and Yao (2012) and Wang and Wheeler (2005). For example, if a 
firm violates an environmental regulation or causes an environmental accident, the firm not only 
has to pay fines and penalties, but may suffer from a loss of trust and reputation or a boycott of 
goods. Such risks have negative effects on the evaluation of a firm's future profits. On the other 
hand, a firm that actively addresses environmental issues might gain positive reputation among 
some stakeholders and may influence them to expect that the firm will succeed in reducing 
environmental risks and production costs in the long term. As a result, better financial performance 
could be a result of better environmental performance. By using the same strategy of instrument 
selection, we take industrial-location average ROA as instrumental variable for firm-level financial 
performance. Industrial-location average of ROA is defined as 
n
jsii 1
js n
jsii 1
Profit
IROA
Asset
=
=
=
∑
∑
, where n is the 
number of firms in industry s, city j.
 3
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Case of the full sample 
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients and their associated standard errors (SEs) of the ordered 
probit model as well as conditional mixed process model (ordered probit model with instrument 
adjustment). As a test of identification, besides the ICOLLEGE and IROA, we include two 
industry-location averages as additional instrument variables. Since the intangible assets 
(knowledge and skills) are embodied in the firm’s employees and the main factor of it is human 
capital, the first variable we include is percentage of total assets represented by intangible assets 
intensity (INTANG) calculated as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. The second variable 
is fixed assets divided by total sales (FIXSALE) which aims to measure a firms’ efficiency in terms 
of amount of fixed asset needed to produce a unit of sale. This variable should affect (negatively) 
the financial performance, but not, at least, intuitively the environmental performance of firms. In 
regression (2), Table 4, we add six instrumental variables in the ordered-probit specification. The 
coefficients on FCOLLEGE, CCOLLEGE and ROA become larger in absolute values, while the 
extents of all instrumental controls enter insignificantly. In regression (3), we instead add these six 
control variables as instruments. To the extent that our instrumental variables have no direct effect 
on firms’ environmental performance as suggest in (regression (2)) and since they influence to 
what extent firms are through FCOLLEGE, CCOLLEGE and ROA, they are valid instruments. 
                                                          
2
 ICOLLEGEjs is computed from the National Bureau of Statistics (NSB) Enterprise Database since our 
sample is not big enough for computing the industry average level of human capital level. 
3
 IROAjs is computed from the National Bureau of Statistics (NSB) Enterprise Database. 
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Adding these additional instruments has the advantage that the model is now over-identified and 
that the validity of the instruments can be tested. We present some tests results to indicate the 
quality and validity of the instrument variables used. The instruments perform well. The F-statistics 
of their joint significance are 77.60, 57.70 and 37.76 respectively and are highly significant. 
Moreover, we conduct over-identification test by a Hansen’s J statistic. Our instrumental variables 
are all significantly correlated with the instrumented variables. As the p-value of Hansen’s J 
statistic is 0.574, we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid 
instruments. These tests provide support for the validity of our instruments. 
Table 4 Estimates for ordered probit environmental compliance model (full sample)  
Variable 
  OPROBIT (1)  OPROBIT (2)  IV OPROBIT (3) 
  COEF  SE  COEF  SE  COEF  SE 
FCOLLEGE   1.761
***
  0.627  1.819
***
  0.636  1.844
***
  0.649 
FSENIOR   1.624
*
  0.868  1.634
*
  0.979  1.674
*
  0.985 
FPRIMARY   -1.594
**
 0.715  -1.609
***
  0.638  -1.645
**
  0.758 
CCOLLEGE   1.723
***
  0.692  1.900
***
  0.531  2.027
***
  0.596 
CSENIOR   0.828  0.579  0.880  0.778  0.863  0.599 
CPRIMARY   -0.941
**
  1.365  -1.017
**
  0.433  -1.038
**
  0.465 
AIRCOLLEGE   1.295
***
  0.445  1.296
**
  0.535  1.295
**
 0.553 
AIRSENIOR   1.377  0.924  1.438  1.006  1.423 1.039 
AIRPRIMARY   -0.574
**
  0.243  -0.586
**
  0.277  -0.580
**
 0.248 
Export   0.186
**
  0.091  0.196
**
  0.099  0.205
**
  0.099 
RD   1.125
***
  0.391  1.095
***
  0.388  1.106
***
  0.390 
SIZE   0.032  0.027  0.035  0.023  0.055  0.027 
AGE   -0.013  0.027  -0.011  0.021  -0.014  0.027 
ROA   0.534
***
 0.240  0.538
**
  0.239  0.543
***
  0.208 
FDI   0.340
***
 0.121  0.340
***
  0.122  0.341
***
 0.120 
Collective   -0.071 0.140  -0.110  0.137  -0.109 0.140 
HMT   0.069 0.121  0.069  0.140  0.066 0.129 
Limited   -0.031  0.107  -0.033  0.108  -0.032  0.107 
Private   0.016 0.063  0.015  0.067  0.021 0.104 
SOE   -0.011  0.034  -0.012  0.034  -0.021  0.032 
AIRquality   1.722
**
  0.742  1.800
**
  0.776  1.755
**
  0.787 
UNEMP   -2.114
***
  0.436  -2.053
***
  0.341  -2.107
***
  0.392 
INTso2   -0.276
**
  0.115  -0.283
**
  0.133  -0.274
**
  0.129 
INTwater   -0.059  0.071  -0.055  0.071  -0.054  0.071 
INTsoot   -0.261
**
  0.118  -0.263
**
  0.120  -0.268
**
  0.118 
MARKET   -0.166  0.192  -0.155  0.172  -0.164  0.190 
GDPcap   0.015
***
 0.003  0.013
***
  0.003  0.015
***
 0.003 
POPdensity   0.185  0.153  0.192  0.154  0.194  0.157 
WEST   -1.047
**
  0.528  -1.040
**
  0.512  -1.062
**
  0.481 
EAST   0.584  0.453  0.573  0.424  0.599  0.474 
ICOLLEGE     0.084  0.384    
IINTANG      0.386  1.061    
BOOK      0.072  0.080    
UNIVERSITY      0.098  0.147    
IROA      1.263  1.025    
IFIXSALE      -0.015  0.028    
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Table 4 Continued 
Variable 
  OPROBIT (1)  OPROBIT (2)  IV OPROBIT (3) 
  COEF  SE  COEF  SE  COEF  SE 
Instrumentation step           
FCOLLEGE             
 ICOLLEGE         0.854
***
 0.327 
 IINTANG         0.130
*
 0.074 
CCOLLEGE            
 BOOK         0.025
***
 0.008 
 UNIVERSITY        0.002
***
 0.0006 
ROA            
 IROA         0.636
***
 0.253 
 IFIXSALE         -0.041
**
 0.022 
Log-likelihood  -1856.653   -1850.212    2187.235   
LR chi2   493.38   495.13       
Prob > chi2   0.000   0.000    0.000   
Pseudo-R
2
   0.197   0.199       
Wald Chi2          612.30   
F-test of instruments 
(in FCOLLEGE regression) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
77.60 
 
{0.000} 
F-test of instruments 
(in CCOLLEGE regression) 
        57.70  {0.000} 
F-test of instruments 
(in ROA regression) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
37.76 
 
{0.000} 
Hansen J-statistics         1.970  {0.574} 
Observations   2554   2554   2554   
*
Significant at 10% level; 
**
Significant at 5% level;
***
Significant at 1% level. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported.  
All regressions allow for clustering by location-industry. 
F-test on instruments is the test statistics on the F-test of the joint significance of the instruments 
(ICOLLEGE, IROA, BOOK, UNIVERSITY, IINTANG and IFIXSALE), with p-values in braces. Hansen 
J-statistics is the test statistic on the overidentification test of instruments, with p-values in braces. 
To account for the endogenous problems, a three-equation instrumental variables version of the ordered 
probit model is estimated, utilizing the CMP package for STATA 12.1. 
With regard to the variables of firm characteristics, results in Table 4 present that, R&D 
expenditure per unit of sales (RD) is consistently positive, suggesting that firms that invest in 
innovation are more likely to observe environmental regulations. Value of exports per unit of 
sales (Export), one of proxies for firms’ international linkage, is found to be positive determinants 
of firms’ environmental performance and the effect is significant. The positive coefficient on 
Export is in line with Christmann and Taylor (2001), who show the evidence that export-oriented 
Chinese firms are more likely to adopt ISO 14001 certification to control for emissions. A similar 
finding has been reported in (Galdeano-Gómez, 2010), where it is argued that an export-oriented 
firm has a better environmental performance in Spanish food industry. The ownership dummies 
show that, consistent with the results of a positive foreign ownership effect from the most 
empirical literature, being a foreign firm or foreign related firm increase the probability of 
compliance with environmental regulations. In terms of other type of ownership, none are found 
to be statistically significant. Finally, return on assets (ROA) which is instrumented by industry-
location IROA is consistently positive and significant. It implies that firms with better financial 
performance tend to more likely to have better environmental performance.  
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Turning to the industrial characteristics variables, the pollution intensive variables suggest 
that firms in pollution intensive sectors are more likely to violate SO2-related regulations and 
SOOT-related regulations although they do not perform significantly worse in polluted water 
related compliance. As Wang and Wheeler (2005) argue that China’s water concentration 
standards are more stringent than its air concentration standards and water emission is targeted by 
more frequently inspections which induces firms to compliance. On the other hand, the abatement 
technology of industrial waste water is a relative common practice in some pollution intensive 
sectors, which induces firms to comply with the standards of acceptable compliance.  
In terms of city control variables, we have the following observations. First, firms located in 
cities with good air quality (AIRquality) are significantly less likely to violate environmental 
regulations. Firms in cities with higher unemployment ratio (UNEMP) is significant more likely 
to be non-compliance. The local government may face larger pressure from the existence of high 
unemployment and tend to have relaxed the environmental. This finding supports the argument in 
Cole et al. (2008b) that a region with a high unemployment rate may make the local government 
tolerate the existence of a polluting plant nearby if it provides employment. Finally, our regional 
variables show that, compared to the reference group (firms located in central part of China), 
being located in the west increases the probability of observing a non-compliance outcome, 
whereas being located in the east is insignificant. 
4.2 Case of Clean and Dirty industrial sectors 
To gauge the relationship between dirtiness of an industry and its environmental performance, we 
divide our sample into six subsets of dirty and relatively clean industrial sectors with respect to 
polluted water intensive sectors, SO2 intensive sectors and soot intensive sectors.  Following the 
classification criterion for defining industries as pollution-intensive industries suggested by (Mani 
and Wheeler, 1998), we rank the industrial sectors on actual emission intensity (emission per unit 
of industrial value-added) by using the data of 2004 Environmental Statistics Yearbook for 
conventional water pollutants, SO2 and soot emissions and 2004 Industrial Statistics Yearbook for 
industrial value added of each sector. By considering the magnitude of sectoral pollution 
intensities simultaneously, we pick up the first 6 dirtiest polluted water-intensive sectors, the first 
13 dirtiest SO2-intensive sectors and the first 5 dirtiest soot-intensive sectors as the dirtiest 
industrial sectors. The rest are considered as relative clean sectors (Table A5). 
Table 5 reports the results in the case of clean and dirty industries. Our estimation is robust 
since the sign and significance of the coefficients of three pollutants are almost similar to those in 
the case of full example in Table 4. The Hansen’s J test results of overidentifying restrictions 
reject the exogeneity assumption for the sub-sample of water-related and soot-related clean 
industries, but fail to reject it for other sub-samples. In either case, the test results are only 
suggestive due to potentially limited power of the test. In the end, exogeneity always needs to be 
assumed and, we see no reason against exogeneity of our instruments. 
One difference between the full sample and dirty and clean industrial sectors is that the 
internal effect of high human capital (FCOLLEGE) is insignificant in clean sectors of category 
SO2 and soot. Internal human capital plays an important role in environmental performance of 
firms in dirty industries. For clean industries, the impact of human capital on environmental 
compliance is mainly explained by the external effect. It is possible that those clean sectors 
generate considerably less industrial SO2 and soot emissions than the relative dirty sectors. In this 
case, high human capital may not play a notable role in pollution abatement. Besides, we can 
observe that in those SO2- and soot-related dirty sectors, firms with international linkage via 
foreign ownership or export-oriented exhibit better compliance with environmental regulatory 
standards than firms with no international linkage.  
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Table 5 Estimates for IV-ordered probit model (clean and dirty industries) 
Variables 
   WATER  SO2  SOOT 
   Dirty  Clean  Dirty  Clean  Dirty  Clean 
    COEF SE  COEF SE  COEF SE  COEF SE COEF SE  COEF SE 
FCOLLEGE    1.691
***
 0.509  1.051
*
 0.629  1.464
**
 0.618  1.744 1.112 2.907
***
 0.878  2.118 1.375 
FSENIOR    1.730
**
 0.983  0.568
*
 0.342  0.286 0.192  0.306 0.251 0.500 0.318  0.287 0.263 
FPRIMARY    -0.439
*
 0.199  -1.629
**
 0.657  -1.124
**
 0.504  -1.130
**
 0.533 -0.503
*
 0.301  -1.330
*
 0.747 
CCOLLEGE    0.787
***
 0.623  1.027
**
 0.450 1.640
**
 0.867  1.698
***
 0.326 1.355
***
 1.497 1.529
***
 0.573 
CSENIOR    1.450 1.421  1.614 1.681 1.465 1.423  1.592 1.294 1.431 1.154 1.245 1.020 
CPRIMARY    -0.937
**
 0.386  -1.200
**
 0.476 -0.562
**
 0.254  -0.712
*
 0.398 -0.821
**
 0.417 -0.726
**
 0.361 
AIRCOLLEGE   1.183
**
 0.477  1.520
**
 0.613 1.335
**
 0.578  1.437
**
 0.591 1.563
**
 0.588 1.897
**
 0.781 
AIRSENIOR    1.366 1.339  0.622 0.506 1.942 1.867  2.112 1.371 1.186 0.775 0.266 0.182 
AIRPRIMARY    -0.617
**
 0.305  -1.282
**
 0.509 -0.514
**
 0.236  -0.721
*
 0.410 -0.425
*
 0.230 -0.676
**
 0.336 
Export    0.679
***
 0.261  0.484
***
 0.126 0.892
**
 0.361  0.337 0.215 0.461
**
 0.231 0.278 0.193 
RD    1.308
***
 0.505  1.296
***
 0.431 0.991
***
 0.274  1.306
***
 0.507 1.226
**
 0.619 1.525
***
 0.442 
SIZE    0.056 0.042  0.038 0.032 0.019 0.038  0.067
*
 0.033 0.014 0.067 0.065
**
 0.027 
AGE    -0.017 0.041  -0.018 0.049 -0.022 0.041  -0.014 0.041 -0.044 0.079 0.026 0.029 
ROA    1.587
**
 0.718  0.387
*
 0.226 1.691
***
 0.587  0.410
**
 0.207 1.546
*
 0.840 0.855
***
 0.314 
FDI    0.704
***
 0.203  0.162
**
 0.081 0.525
***
 0.182  0.267 0.168 0.285
**
 0.114 0.440 0.277 
Collective    -0.130 0.195  -0.236 0.184 -0.107 0.191  -0.113 0.204 -0.109 0.323 -0.063 0.144 
HMT    0.101 0.193  0.138 0.154 0.059 0.167  -0.064 0.167 -0.267 0.287 0.117 0.121 
Limited    -0.094 0.167  -0.119 0.137 0.064 0.179  -0.132 0.156 -0.171 0.238 0.033 0.125 
Private    0.157 0.169  -0.054 0.133 0.261 0.149  -0.097 0.133 -0.122 0.257 0.124 0.119 
SOE    -0.041 0.087  -0.160 0.160 -0.169 0.154  -0.189 0.142 0.208 0.305 -0.053 0.152 
AIRquality    2.658
**
 1.136  1.204 0.747 2.863
***
 0.786  3.787
**
 1.565 2.906
**
 1.378 2.674
**
 1.151 
UNEMP    -2.734
***
 0.795  -1.920
***
 0.475 -2.905
***
 0.499  -1.832
***
 0.481 -3.651
***
 1.055 -2.113
***
 0.392 
MARKET    -0.233 0.184  -0.146 0.121 -0.177 0.172  -0.295 0.284 -0.011 0.041 -0.154
*
 0.083 
GDPcap    0.016
***
 0.005  0.015
***
 0.004 0.014
***
 0.004  0.014
**
 0.004 0.020
**
 0.009 0.012
***
 0.003 
POPdensity    0.234 0.177  0.067 0.142 0.085 0.059  0.190 0.202 0.184 0.124 0.174
*
 0.098 
WEST    -1.433
**
 0.618  -0.869 0.572 -0.699
**
 0.363  -1.697
***
 0.461 -1.049
*
 0.624 -1.403 0.899 
EAST    0.448 0.452  0.515 0.510 0.471 0.304  0.474 0.484 0.456 0.486 0.660 0.526 
*
Significant at 10% level; 
**
Significant at 5% level; 
***
Significant at 1% level. 
All regressions allow for clustering by location-industry.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported.  
To account for the endogenous problems, a two-equation instrumental variables version of the ordered probit model is estimated, utilizing the CMP package 
for STATA 12.1. 
F-test on instruments is the test statistics on the F-test of the joint significance of the instruments (ICOLLEGE, IROA, IINTANG and IFIXSALE), with p-
values in braces. Hansen J-statistics is the test statistic on the overidentification test of instruments, with p-values in braces. 
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Table 5 continued 
Variables 
   WATER  SO2  SOOT 
   Dirty  Clean  Dirty  Clean  Dirty  Clean 
    COEF SE  COEF SE  COEF SE  COEF SE COEF SE  COEF SE 
Instrumentation step 
FCOLLEGE                     
  ICOLLEGE  0.788
***
 0.261  0.789
**
 0.396  0.841
***
 0.164  0.870
***
 0.245  0.850
***
 0.259  0.883
***
 0.167 
  IINTANG  0.491
*
 0.274  0.202
*
 0.115  0.501
**
 0.237  0.184
*
 0.107  0.518
*
 0.282  0.396
***
 0.147 
CCOLLEGE                     
  BOOK  0.030
**
 0.012  0.025
***
 0.008  0.022
***
 0.005  0.027
***
 0.009  0.021
***
 0.007  0.026
***
 0.009 
  UNIVERSITY 0.003
***
 0.001  0.004
***
 0.001  0.004
***
 0.001  0.005
**
 0.002  0.003
**
 0.0015 0.002
**
 0.001 
ROA                     
  IROA  0.583
***
 0.087  0.677
***
 0.169  0.476
***
 0.091  0.802
***
 0.227  0.441
***
 0.114  0.675
***
 0.086 
  IFIXSALE  -0.176
**
 0.097  -0.048
**
 0.025  -0.057
***
 0.017  -0.104
*
 0.057  -0.094
**
 0.047  -0.114
**
 0.053 
Log-likelihood     575.64   852.012   566.510   852.895   369.336   944.792  
Prob > chi2    0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Wald Chi2    243.99   195.74   264.33   329.98   136.20   288.49  
F-test of instruments 
(in FCOLLEGE regression) 
 
86.32 {0.000} 
 
67.33 {0.000} 56.34 {0.000} 
 
85.13 {0.000} 62.19 {0.000} 
 
96.49 {0.000} 
F-test of instruments 
(in CCOLLEGE regression) 
 
32.97 {0.000} 40.96 {0.000} 29.71 {0.000} 43.91 {0.000} 18.71 {0.000} 66.13 {0.000} 
F-test of instruments 
(in ROA regression) 
   22.40 {0.000} 50.55 {0.002} 26.60 {0.000} 48.57 {0.000} 19.94 {0.000} 57.81 {0.000} 
Hansen J-statistics    2.176 {0.542}  1.715 {0.016} 1.985 {0.483}  2.627 {0.569} 1.736 {0.512} 3.742 {0.037} 
Observations    835   1719   1023   1531   436   2118  
*
Significant at 10% level; 
**
Significant at 5% level; 
***
Significant at 1% level. 
All regressions allow for clustering by location-industry.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported.  
To account for the endogenous problems, a two-equation instrumental variables version of the ordered probit model is estimated, utilizing the CMP package for the STATA 12.1. 
F-test on instruments is the test statistics on the F-test of the joint significance of the instruments (ICOLLEGE, IROA, IINTANG and IFIXSALE), with p-values in braces. Hansen 
J-statistics is the test statistic on the overidentification test of instruments, with p-values in braces. 
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4.3 Marginal and interaction effects 
Neither the signs nor the magnitudes of the coefficients are directly interpretable in the ordered 
probit model. It is necessary to compute partial effects of something similar to interpret the model 
meaningfully. As mentioned by Mallick (2009) the marginal effect of a variable that is interacted 
with another variable differs from the marginal effect of a variable that is not interacted with any 
variable. Hence a direct application of the standard software (such as STATA 12) might lead to 
incorrect estimates of the magnitude and standard error of the interaction term in nonlinear 
models. Follow Mallick (2009), we calculate the consistent ordered probit marginal effects as 
well as interaction effects for interaction terms by assuming that the effects are evaluated at the 
mean values of repressors as shown in Table 6 and Table 7. 4 
Table 6 Marginal effects for firms’ environmental compliance 
Variables 
 Over-compliance  Compliance  Non-compliance 
 ME  SE  ME  SE  ME  SE 
FCOLLEGE 0.456
***
 0.155 0.258
***
 0.100 -0.714
***
 0.198 
FSENIOR 0.414 0.257 0.235
*
 0.139 -0.648 0.400 
FPRIMARY -0.407
**
 0.182 -0.231
**
 0.104 0.637
**
 0.286 
CCOLLEGE 0.257
***
 0.046 0.145
***
 0.026 -0.402
***
 0.071 
CSENIOR -0.334 0.301 0.213 0.192 0.121 0.110 
CPRIMARY -1.194
**
 0.535 -0.676
**
 0.305 1.870
**
 0.846 
Export 0.048
*
 0.025 0.027
*
 0.014 --0.076
**
 0.039 
RD 0.429
***
 0.153 -0.274
***
 0.100 -0.155
***
 0.057 
SIZE 0.022 0.014 -0.014 0.009 -0.008 0.005 
AGE -0.005 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.004 
ROA 0.090
**
 0.041 0.051
**
 0.023 -0.140
**
 0.065 
FDI 0.087
***
 0.031 0.041
***
 0.014 -0.127
***
 0.043 
Collective -0.043 0.055 0.026 0.033 0.016 0.023 
HMT 0.016 0.029 0.010 0.018 -0.026 0.047 
Limited -0.013 0.042 0.008 0.027 0.005 0.015 
Private 0.008 0.039 -0.005 0.026 -0.003 0.014 
SOE -0.008 0.051 0.005 0.033 0.003 0.019 
AIRquality 0.434
**
 0.205 0.246
*
 0.128 -0.680
*
 0.354 
UNEMP -1.042
***
 0.269 -0.591
***
 0.150 1.633
***
 0.407 
INTso2 -0.106
**
 0.046 0.068
**
 0.032 0.038
*
 0.020 
INTwater -0.013 0.015 -0.008 0.009 0.021 0.022 
INTsoot -0.103
**
 0.044 0.066
*
 0.034 0.037
*
 0.019 
MARKET -0.064 0.051 0.041 0.044 0.023 0.025 
GDPcap 0.004
***
 0.001 0.002
***
 0.001 -0.006
***
 0.001 
POPdensity 0.047 0.039 0.027 0.023 -0.074 0.060 
WEST -0.397
*
 0.225 0.139 0.090 0.258
*
 0.131 
EAST 0.118 0.115 0.117 0.120 -0.235 0.220 
*
Significant at 10% level;
**
Significant at 5% level;
***
Significant at 1% level. 
ME: Marginal effect on probabilities averaged over all observations; SE, standard error of the ME 
Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means according to Mallick (2009). Standard errors are 
calculated with the delta method. MEs are calculated based on the results of conditional mixed process 
(CMP) regression. 
                                                          
4
 The marginal and interaction effects have different signs for different observations, this issue can be 
avoided by assuming that the effect are evaluated at the mean value of explanatory variables (Ai and 
Norton, 2003) 
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Table 6 depicts marginal effects for an ordered probit of the estimation of environmental 
performances of industrial firms. It shows the implied effect of explanatory variables, and the 
associated standard errors of the marginal effect, on the probabilities of all three environmental 
behaviors. The positive effect of COLLEGE in Table 4 translates into positive marginal effects 
for Over-compliance and compliance but negative effect for the non-compliance firms, all of 
which are statistically significant (Table 6). In particular, a 10% rise in FCOLLEGE increases 
probabilities of over-compliance and compliance with environmental regulations by 0.046 and 
0.026 respectively, but decreases probability of non-compliance by 0.071. The marginal increase 
in FSENIOR only increases the probability of compliance by 23.5% but this effect is just weakly 
significant at 10% significant level. When education level of employees becomes lower, a 
marginal increase in FPRIMARY decreases the probabilities of over-compliance and compliance 
by 40.7% and 23.1% respectively but for non-compliance the probability increases by 63.7%. In 
terms of external effect of human capital, we can find a marginal increase in the share of college 
educated population (CCOLLEGE) leads to an increase in probabilities of over-compliance and 
compliance by 0.257 and 0.145 respectively but decrease the probability of non-compliance by 
almost 0.402. When it comes to the share of primary school educated population, the result is 
opposite. The marginal effects of CPRIMARY on the probability of over-compliance, compliance 
and non-compliance are -1.194, -0.676 and 1.870 respectively. However, we cannot find 
significant marginal effect of external senior school educated population on environmental 
performance of firms. 
As for other firm level characteristics, we can find that compliance probabilities are also 
significantly related to international linkage variables.  Looking at the effects of export, Table 6 
shows that, on average, being an export-oriented firm is more likely to be over-compliance and 
compliance. A 10% increase in export increases the probabilities of over-compliance by 5 
percentage points. In terms of ownership, Table 7 indicates that, relative to the reference group of 
public firms, firms with foreign ownership are 8.7% and 4.1% respectively, more likely to be 
over-compliance and compliance group, but 12.7% less likely to compliance with environmental 
regulations. A marginal increase in R&D expenditure increases the probability of being over-
compliance by 0.429 and for compliance and non-compliance it decreases 0.274 and 0.155 
respectively. A possible explanation for the result that R&D expenditure is negatively associated 
with firms’ compliance behavior is the following. Those firms (with just compliance) which have 
more expenditure on R&D may cut the budget on investment in pollution abatement and 
treatment. A further firm-internal factor that significantly associated with environmental behavior 
of firms is ROA. A marginal increase in ROA increases the probabilities of being over-
compliance and compliance by 0.09 and 0.05 respectively but decreases the probability of non-
compliance by 0.14. 
Turning to the sector characteristics, Table 6 indicates that, firms in SO2-intensive and soot-
intensive industries are less likely to be over-compliance but they are more likely to be 
compliance and non-compliance. For firms in SO2-intensive industries, other explanatory factors 
being controlled equal, they are 10.6% less likely to being over-compliance but more likely to 
being compliance and non-compliance by  6.8% and 3.8% respectively. Being included in soot-
intensive industries, on average, decreases the probabilities of over-compliance by 10.3% but 
increases the probabilities of compliance and non-compliance by 6.6% and 3.7% respectively. 
In terms of our city and regional characteristics included in the model, we find that being 
located in cities with higher income and lower unemployment ratio, firms tend to be more likely 
to over-compliance and compliance with environmental regulations. Firms that located in high 
unemployment cities have the higher chance of being in the non-compliance group. 1 percent 
increase in unemployment ratio of a city increases the probability of infringing environmental 
regulations by 1.63% for firms in this city. This finding is coherent to the conclusion of some 
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existing studies discussing the impact of industrial activities on environmental quality in China, 
as Cole et al. (2008b), who find that a region with a high unemployment rate would tend to have 
relax environmental regulations and attract more pollution intensive industries. Other factors 
being equal, 1 unit increase in GDP per capita of cities increases the probabilities of over-
compliance and compliance by 0.4% and 0.2% respectively for firms located in those cities, but 
decreases the probability of non-compliance by 0.6%. A marginal increase in ratio of days with 
good air quality within one year increases the probabilities of being over-compliance and 
compliance by 0.434 and 0.246 respectively. For other regional dummies, on average, being 
located in the west decrease the probability of over-compliance and increase the probability of 
non-compliance, but the probability of compliance does not seem to be much related to the 
western location.  
The interaction effects of interaction terms as shown in Table 7 suggest that college educated 
population are more sensitive to environmental quality and are likely to impose greater pressure 
on the stringency of regulations to impel firm over-comply and comply with environmental 
regulations. While the primary school and below educated is more likely to induce government to 
relax the environmental regulation, resulting in environmental non-compliance. As for senior 
school educated population, they are not more sensitive to environmental quality as compared to 
the reference group (the junior school educated population). 
Table 7 Magnitudes of the interaction effects 
Interaction 
Over-compliance  Compliance  Non-compliance 
IE  SE  IE  SE  IE   SE 
AIRCOLLEGE 2.089
***
 0.711  1.184
***
 0.440  -3.273
***
  1.133 
AIRSENIOR 1.173 0.747  0.665 0.398  -1.838  1.178 
AIRPRIMARY -1.432
**
 0.642  -0.812
**
 0.374  2.244
**
  1.025 
*
Significant at 10% level;
**
Significant at 5% level;
***
Significant at 1% level. 
IE: Interaction effect on probabilities averaged over all observations; SE, standard error of the IE 
Magnitudes of the interaction terms are obtained according to Mallick (2009). Standard errors are 
calculated with the delta method. MEs are calculated based on the results of conditional mixed process 
(CMP) regression. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have empirically examined the internal and external effects of human capital on 
environmental compliance by using the real environmental performance data of Chinese 
industrial firms. Our estimation shows that firms’ compliance decisions are not only affected by 
their internal endowment of human capital, but also impacted by the external stock of social 
human capital. Firms with high human capital are more likely to have better environmental 
compliance. The study also finds that highly educated local population (CCOLLEGE) contributes 
firms’ environmental performance. In contrast, a low level of education in the local population 
(CPRIMARY) is associated with poorer compliance. The results are still significant after we give 
thought to the possible endogeneity of both internal and external human capital. However, for 
clean industries, our results demonstrate that the variation in external human capital is a better 
determinant of the firms’ environmental performances than is the variation in internal human 
capital. We do not find supporting evidence for the internal effect of human capital in SO2- 
related and SOOT-related clean industries when we decompose our data into dirty and clean 
sectors by pollution intensity of industries in the terms of industrial polluted water emission, 
industrial SO2 emission and industrial soot emission. 
The findings in this study have important policy implications. The role of city-wide human 
capital levels in compliance suggests that there is a positive externality from education. More 
generally, evidence from this study suggests that the situation of weak implementation of 
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environmental supervision and evasion of environmental monitoring could be reconciled by 
internal and external effects of human capital. On the regulator side, a strategy of boosting the 
educational attainment of the population may be recommended to pull firms into better 
environmental compliance. On the firm side, raising human capital may induce improved 
environmental performance. 
Although we have established the importance for compliance of external human capital, we 
do not know the exact route by which higher education levels influence firm behavior. It could be 
that human capital levels in the regulatory agency track general education level and so city-level 
human capital is a proxy for the human capital of the environmental agency. Alternatively, it 
could be individuals with higher education levels are more sensitive to compliance and/or more 
efficient in making complaints, lobbying for controls and prompting investigations into 
compliance. This is an issue that requires further research.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 Indicators Assessing Firm Environmental Behavior 
No. Indicator Note 
1 
 
Emission compliance 
The rate of emission compliance of major controlled pollutants from 
all outlets should be greater than and equal to 80% or the average 
concentration of major controlled pollutants should comply with 
relevant emission standards. The rate of disposal/utilization of 
hazardous wastes should be 100%. 
2 
 Repeated occurrence of 
environmental non-compliance 
The ratio of non-compliance to the frequency of environmental 
inspection and monitoring is greater and equal to 50%. 
3 
 
Total volume control 
-Firm which holds pollutant discharge permit should comply with 
the requirements of the permit. 
-Firm which do not have pollutant discharge permit should comply 
with emission standards. 
4 
 
Administrative penalty 
Firm has one or more records of non-compliance according to on-
site environmental inspection. 
5 
 
Environmental pollution 
accident 
i) General accident: once or more times occurrence of pollution 
accident with direct economic loss over 1 000 RMB and lower than 
10 000 RMB. 
ii) Serious accident (at least one of the following four situations): 
-Direct economic loss caused by the accident is greater than 10 000 
RMB and lower than 50 000 RMB; 
-Poisoning symptom occurred; 
-Conflicts among citizens and the firm caused by the accident  
-The accident causes environmental damage. 
iii) More serious accident (at least one of the following situations) 
-Direct economic loss caused by the accident is greater than 50 000 
RMB and lower than 100 000 RMB; 
-The poisoning occurred leads to potential permanent disability; 
iv) The most serious accident: direct economic loss caused by the 
accident is greater than 100 000 RMB. 
6 
 
On-time payment of pollution 
levy 
Firm pays for pollution levy on time in at least 70% of twelve 
months of a year and pays for pollution levy within 2 months in the 
left months of a year. 
7 
 
On-time reporting of emissions 
Firm finishes annual reporting of emissions on time. The Firm, 
which holds pollutant discharge permit, reports its monthly 
emissions on time. 
8 
 
Standardized emission outlet 
-The emission outlets should be checked and accepted by EPB if the 
Firm has the liability of pollution abatement. 
-The emission outlets if not specified should be standardized. 
9 
 Implementation of the System 
of “Three Synchronous 
Requirements” and 
environmental management 
procedure for construction 
projects 
-Firm should conduct environmental protection preliminary hearing 
on time when proposes the project. 
-Firm should conduct environmental impact assessment on time 
when conducts the feasibility study. 
-Firm complies with the requirements defined by Regulation of 
Environmental Management of Construction Project. 
10 
 Environmental organization 
Environmental protection staff 
Environmental management 
system 
Firm has environmental organization.                 
Firm has full-time or part-time environmental protection staff. 
Firm has corporate environmental management systems to fulfill 
corporate environmental management task. 
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Table A1 Continued 
No. Indicator Note 
11 
 Comprehensive utilization rate of 
industrial solid wastes greater than 
or equal to 80% 
Disposal rate of industrial solid wastes should be 100% and the 
comprehensive utilization rate of industrial solid wastes greater 
than or equal to 80%.  
12 
 
Repeated occurrence of public 
complains 
The municipal government receives more three times of public 
complains and corporate environmental performance causes 
certain environmental impacts and damage. 
13 
 
Occurrence of public complain 
The municipal government receives once public complain and 
corporate environmental performance causes certain 
environmental impacts. 
14 
 
Cleaner production 
Firm passes cleaner production audit and corporate 
environmental management reaches domestic top level and 
advanced international level. 
15  ISO 14000 certification Firm passes ISO 14000 certification and gains certificate. 
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Figure A1 Conceptual Scheme of the Grading System 
 
 
Note: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15 represent 14 indicators assessing firms’ environmental performances 
in Table A1. 
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Table A1 Information of dropped data 
CITY  Green  Blue  Yellow  Red  Black  Total  
Percen
t 
Changde  0  1  0  0  0  1  0.1 
Changzhou  0  1  1  0  0  2  0.2 
Chaohu  1  3  0  0  0  4  0.3 
Chongqing  0  2  0  1  0  3  0.3 
Hangzhou  19  52  41  2  0  114  9.7 
Huaibei  2  9  1  0  0  12  1.0 
Huainan  0  7  10  0  0  17  1.4 
Huhehot  4  12  7  0  0  23  2.0 
Jiaozuo  0  1  2  0  0  3  0.3 
Jiayuguan  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0 
Jinan  1  4  3  1  0  9  0.8 
Liuzhou  2  16  9  0  0  27  2.3 
Maanshan  0  4  3  0  0  7  0.6 
Nanjing  37  92  88  9  2  228  19.4 
Nantong  7  11  13  0  1  32  2.7 
Ningbo  23  102  59  2  0  186  15.8 
Suzhou  34  122  102  6  1  265  22.6 
Taizhou  4  16  6  1  2  29  2.5 
Tongling  7  22  10  3  0  42  3.6 
Wenzhou  2  6  4  0  0  12  1.0 
Wuxi  8  21  9  4  1  43  3.7 
Xuzhou  0  7  7  3  2  19  1.6 
Yancheng  2  5  4  1  0  12  1.0 
Yangzhou  0  3  8  0  0  11  0.9 
Yantai  0  1  1  0  0  2  0.2 
Zhenjiang  9  19  17  2  1  48  4.1 
Zhuzhou  0  4  4  0  1  9  0.8 
Zibo  1  3  8  2  1  15  1.3 
Total  163  546  417  37  12  1175   
% of firms  
in each 
level 
 
13.9  46.5  35.5  3.1  1.0     
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Table A3 Variables and definitions 
Variables  Definition Source 
Environmental compliance 
 =2 if the firm environmental behavior is evaluated as “blue” and “green”; =1 if the 
firm’s environmental behavior is evaluated as “yellow”; =0 otherwise 
④ 
Human capital 
variables 
 FCOLLEGE  share of college educated (and above) employees in the firm ① 
 FSENIOR  share of employees with senior high school education in the firm  
 FJUNIOR  share of employees with junior high school education in the firm ① 
 FPRIMARY  share of employees with primary school education (and below) in the firm ① 
 CCOLLEGE  share of college educated (and above) population in the city ⑤ 
 CSENIOR  share of senior high school educated population in the city  
 CJUNIOR  share of junior high school educated population in the city ⑤ 
 CPRIMARY  share of primary school educated (and below) population in the city ⑤ 
Firm-level 
variables 
 RD  R&D expenditure/sales ① 
 SIZE  the logarithm of the number of employees by the end of the year ① 
 Age  The age of the firm ① 
 Exports  Total export/total sales ① 
 ROA  Earnings before interest and tax EBIT/Total Assets ① 
 
HMT 
 Dummy variable,=1 if the firm is registered as joint ventures, cooperative with Hong 
Kong, Macau, Taiwan investors, or HMT wholly owned companies, or HMT 
shareholding limited companies; =0, otherwise 
① 
 
FDI 
 Dummy variable,=1 if the firm is registered as joint ventures, cooperative with foreign 
investors, or wholly foreign owned companies, or foreign shareholding limited 
companies; =0, otherwise 
① 
 
SOE 
 Dummy variable,=1 if the firm is registered as state-owned enterprises, including 
alliances of SOEs and unlisted state-owned limited companies; =0, otherwise 
① 
 
Collective 
 Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is registered as collectives or alliances of collectives; 
=0, otherwise. 
① 
 Public  Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is a public listed company; =0, otherwise ① 
 
Limited 
 Dummy variable,=1 if the firm is registered as unlisted non-state-owned limited 
companies; =0, otherwise. 
① 
 Private  Dummy variable,=1 if the firm is registered as private; =0, otherwise. ① 
Industry-level 
variables 
 INTso2  Industrial SO2 emission/industrial value added ②③ 
 INTwater  Industrial waste water emission/industrial value added ②③ 
 INTsoot  Industrial soot emission/industrial value added ②③ 
Regional 
variables 
 
Market 
 Measurement if marketization of province level from Marketization of China’s 
provinces 2004 report. Higher value indicates Higher entry barrier at province level. 
⑥ 
 Unemployment  Unemployment rate of the city ⑤ 
 BOOK  Average number of books in public libraries in the city.  
 UNIVERSITY  Number of universities and colleges in the city.  
 AIRquality  Ratio of days with excellent or good air quality in urban areas in one year ② 
 POPdensity  Population density ⑤ 
 WEST  Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is located in the western China; =0, otherwise ⑤ 
 CENTER  Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is located in the central China; =0, otherwise ⑤ 
 EAST  Dummy variable, =1 if the firm is located in the eastern China; =0, otherwise ⑤ 
Interactions 
 AIRCOLLEGE  Interaction between AIRquality and CCOLLEGE ②⑤ 
 AIRSENIOR  Interaction between AIRquality and CSENIOR ②⑤ 
 AIRJUNIOR  Interaction between AIRquality and CJUNIOR ②⑤ 
Data source:  
①China industrial enterprises database (survey data 2005);  
②China Environmental Statistics Yearbook (2005);  
③China Industrial statistics yearbook (2005);  
④EMP Environmental information disclosure system data (2004);  
⑤China City Statistical Yearbook (2005);  
⑥Marketization of China’s provinces 2004 report. 
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Table A4 Statistical description of the data (2004) 
Variable  Unit  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
FCOLLEGE  ratio 2554  0.143 0.160  0.000  1.000 
FSENIOR  ratio 2554  0.374 0.220  0.000  1.000 
FJUNIOR  ratio 2554  0.483 0.287  0.000  1.000 
FPRIMARY  ratio 2554  0.017 0.012  0.000  0.276 
CCOLLEGE  ratio 2554  0.061 0.030  0.014  0.117 
CSENIOR  ratio 2554  0.132 0.028  0.061  0.243 
CJUNIOR  ratio 2554  0.351 0.033  0.295  0.469 
CPRIMARY  ratio 2554  0.456 0.048  0.327  0.613 
AIRCOLLEGE CCOLLEGE
*
AIRquality 2554  0.047 0.025  0.006  0.095 
AIRSENIOR  CSENIOR
*
AIRquality 2554  0.276 0.051  0.147  0.416 
AIRJUNIOR  CJUNIOR
*
AIRquality 2554  0.363 0.083  0.138  0.533 
Exports  ratio 2554  0.171 0.307  0.000  1.000 
RD  ratio 2554  0.002 0.010  0.000  0.249 
SIZE  log form of employment 2554  5.595 1.206  1.792  10.843 
AGE  year 2554  1.061 1.152  0.069  19.340 
ROA  ratio 2554  0.045 0.108  -1.628  1.108 
IROA  ratio 2554  0.049 0.055  -0.240  0.637 
FDI  dummy 2554  0.177 0.382  0.000  1.000 
Collective  dummy 2554  0.052 0.223  0.000  1.000 
HMT  dummy 2554  0.121 0.326  0.000  1.000 
Limited  dummy 2554  0.170 0.376  0.000  1.000 
Private  dummy 2554  0.330 0.470  0.000  1.000 
SOE  dummy 2554  0.070 0.256  0.000  1.000 
AIRquality
 
 ratio 2554  0.791 0.136  0.421  0.992 
UNEMP
 
 ratio 2554  0.071 0.012  0.026  0.101 
INTso2  tonnes per million yuan of value added 2554  0.027 0.046  0.0003  0.235 
INTwater  
1000 tonnes per million yuan of value 
added 
2554  0.061 0.086  0.002  0.373 
INTsoot  tonnes per million yuan of value added 2554  0.035 0.081  0.0003  0.312 
MARKET  index 2554  8.400 1.358  3.950  9.770 
GDPcap  1000 yuan per capita 2554  35.155 14.561  6.495  57.992 
POPdensity  1000 people/sq.km 2554  1.503 1.010  0.095  2.927 
BOOK  books per person 2554  0.466 0.369  0.100  2.000 
UNIVERSITY   / 2554  11.278 10.866  2.000  58.000 
WEST  dummy 2554  0.086 0.265  0.000  1.000 
CENTER  dummy 2554  0.172 0.280  0.000  1.000 
EAST  dummy 2554  0.742 0.364  0.000  1.000 
 
 
 
 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 12-05
27 
Table A5 Pollution intensities of industries 2004 
Industrial sector 
WATER  SO2  SOOT 
Emission  
intensity 
Rank  
Emission  
intensity 
Rank  
Emission 
intensity 
Rank 
Electric & Heating Power 5938.63 8  23.49 1  8.42 2 
Electronic Machinery and Equipment 298.99 32  0.05 34  0.05 33 
Apparel, Shoes, and Hat Manufacturing 1007.00 27  0.11 30  0.07 31 
Textile 6475.27 6  1.24 15  0.53 18 
Mining and Processing of Nonmetal Ores 6136.10 7  2.38 11  6.05 3 
Nonmetallic Minerals Products 2097.00 21  7.67 2  31.16 1 
Recycling 1522.35 22  0.45 21  0.40 19 
Handicraft Article 244.96 34  0.04 35  0.05 32 
Mining & Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores 5458.91 10  2.18 12  2.11 11 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 4347.55 12  2.64 10  4.08 4 
Chemical Fibers 11829.49 4  2.89 8  0.98 16 
Chemical Materials & Chemical Products 9466.92 5  3.03 7  1.99 12 
Furniture 201.34 35  0.09 31  0.07 30 
Transportation Equipment 1170.13 26  0.16 28  0.32 22 
Metal Product 1192.70 24  0.24 26  0.19 24 
Coal Mining and Washing 2745.22 17  0.84 18  1.50 13 
Wood Processing and Product 2358.70 19  1.26 14  2.14 10 
Agricultural & By-Product 5337.27 11  0.92 17  1.38 14 
Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 2333.75 20  0.24 25  0.19 25 
Natural Gas Production and Distribution 12898.58 2  4.12 5  2.61 8 
Petroleum 3499.49 16  3.87 6  3.54 5 
Food Manufacturing 4321.34 13  0.96 16  0.62 17 
Production and Distribution of Water 5511.33 9  0.29 23  0.11 28 
Plastics 281.01 33  0.12 29  0.09 29 
Communication Equipment 303.24 31  0.03 36  0.03 36 
General Machinery 892.41 28  0.30 22  0.31 23 
Rubber 1271.57 23  0.81 19  0.35 21 
Tobacco Products 168.77 36  0.07 32  0.04 34 
Medicines 3652.88 15  0.76 20  0.39 20 
Stationery and Sporting Goods 1182.39 25  0.23 27  0.11 27 
Beverage Manufacturing 3753.42 14  1.27 13  1.10 15 
Printing and Recording Media Reproducing 342.81 30  0.05 33  0.04 35 
Non-Ferrous Metal Ore Mining 12036.19 3  2.66 9  2.38 9 
Smelting & Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 2565.46 18  5.08 3  2.82 7 
Paper and Paper Products 37305.11 1  4.57 4  2.84 6 
Special Machinery  855.73 29  0.26 24  0.17 26 
Note: pollution intensities are measured as tonnes per million yuan of industrial value added 
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